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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Tashina Marie Alley (hereinafter, Tashina) appeals from her judgment of
conviction for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver a
controlled substance and conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug
paraphernalia. She asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss
and by instructing the jury that a mistake of law is not a defense to a conspiracy charge.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 8, 2011, Detective Joseph Andreoli began a drug investigation at
a warehouse near Costco in Boise. (Tr., p.509, Ls.2-23.)

He eventually connected the

warehouse to Morgan Alley (hereinafter, Morgan) and the Red Eye Hut and began
surveillance on Morgan's residence and the store. Detective Andreoli testified that he
saw Tashina, Morgan's wife, enter the warehouse for several minutes on September 12,
2011 and exit the warehouse on September 13. (Tr., p.528, Ls.1-6, p.598, Ls.6-7.)
Detective Andreoli first connected the Red Eye Hut to the warehouse on
September 22, 2011 and entered the store on September 26. (Tr, p.529, L.13 - p.530,
L. 7.) He believed the store was a "head shop" selling drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.531,
Ls.1-24.) On September 22, he saw Tashina drive from her residence to the store,
where she "approached the door and spoke with somebody inside the Red Eye Hut."
(Tr., p.551, Ls.18-23.)

She did not enter that day.

(Tr., p.551, Ls.24-25.)

On

September 26, Morgan and Tashina drove to the Red Eye Hut; Morgan exited the
vehicle and Tashina drove away. (Tr., p.552, Ls.12-21.)
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After several controlled buys at the Red Eye Hut that contained the chemicals
JWH-019 and AM-2201, search warrants were executed on the warehouse, Morgan
and Tashina's residence, and the Red Eye Hut. Tashina spoke with Detective Andreoli
during the search of the residence. According to the detective, Tashina stated that she
was "well aware of" what was happening at the warehouse and the Red Eye Hut and
that she had been to both locations. (Tr., p.832, Ls.1-4.) Detective Andreoli testified
that Tashina stated that, "what we are doing is completely legal" because other people
in Boise were doing the same thing. (Tr., p.832, Ls.8-14.) She stated that they were
selling "Twizted Potpourri." (Tr., p.834, Ls.8-9.) 1
Morgan admitted that he had been using the warehouse to make Twizted
Potpourri. He believed that the substance AM-2201 had not been made illegal by Idaho
law and he applied this chemical to plant material at the warehouse, which would
eventually be sold at the Red Eye Hut. (Tr., p.1424, L.17- p.1425, L.10.) Morgan had
a lab report that stated that AM-2201 was legal in Idaho. (Tr., p.1426, Ls.12-14.) He
testified that the he applied AM-2201 to plant material to make the potpourri; he did not
testify to using any other chemical. (Tr., p.1463, Ls.19-25.) Morgan also testified that
Tashina was not at all involved in the business of making potpourri and that his
involvement in the business nearly cost him his marriage. (Tr., p.1513, Ls.4-10, p.1518,
Ls.23-25.)
Tashina was charged with conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with
intent to deliver a controlled substance, conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to

1

Detective Andreoli also believed that Tashina took a document that he believed to be
diluting instructions with regard to synthetic cannabinoids from the residence and
flushed it down the toilet at the jail. (Tr., p.838, Ls.10-23.) This allegation was the basis
for a destruction of evidence charge on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
(R., p.437.)

2

deliver drug paraphernalia, and destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence.
(R., p.30.)

Her case was consolidated with Charlynda Lynn Goggin, Cadee Jo

Peterson, Matthew Taylor, and Morgan, among others. (R., p.37.)
Morgan filed a motion to dismiss, which was subsequently joined by Tashina.
(R., p.69.)

Morgan asserted that Idaho had not criminalized AM-2201 and that

I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30(ii), which defined synthetic cannabinoids, was unconstitutionally
vague.

(3/12/12/ Tr., p22., L.16 - p.27, L.6.)

The district court denied the motion,

holding that AM-2201 was illegal at the time and that the statute was constitutional.
(R., p.185.) Morgan thereafter pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the
denial of the motion to dismiss. (See State v. Alley, docket number 40428.) Morgan's
case is currently before the Court of Appeals.
Tashina went to trial and was found guilty of the conspiracy charges but the jury
was unable to reach a verdict on the destruction of evidence charge. (R., pp.435-37.)
The district court imposed unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and the
court suspended the sentences and placed Tashina on probation. (R., p.451.) Tashina
appealed. (R., p.445.)

3

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by denying Ms. Alley's motion to dismiss?

2.

Did the district court err by instructing the jury that a mistake of law was not a
defense to conspiracy?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Dismiss

A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, Morgan filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that AM-2201 had not

been criminalized in Idaho at the relevant time in this case. The district court denied the
motion, holding that AM-2201 had been criminalized and that I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30(ii)
was not was unconstitutionally vague. (R., p.185.) While Morgan subsequently entered
a conditional guilty plea preserving the right to appeal from this ruling, Tashina went to
trial. She now asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion Morgan filed
and that she eventually joined.

B.

Standard Of Review
In interpreting statutory language, a reviewing court gives the words their plan,

usual ordinary meaning; where language is not ambiguous, the court should not resort
to legislative history or any other sources. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011 ). The interpretation of a statute presents questions of law
over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,
798 (2004).

Where the constitutionality of a statute is likewise a question of law over

which this Court exercises free review. Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903 (2003).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Dismiss
As the district court noted in the order denying the motion to dismiss, the motion

was initially filed by Morgan and then later joined by several codefendants, including
Tashina. (R., p.208.) The court noted that Tashina and the other defendants did not file
5

briefs or examine witnesses in this matter, and thus the court based its conclusion
solely on the arguments and evidence presented by Morgan.

(R., p.208.)

Further,

Tashina recognizes that the decision by the Court of Appeals will control in this case as
well.
Due to the fact that Tashina simply joined Morgan's arguments in the district
court and the issue was decided solely on the evidence and argument submitted by
Morgan, and Tashina's recognition that Morgan's case will control hers, Tashina adopts
the arguments Morgan has made in his case at the Court of Appeals.

Morgan's

opening and reply briefs are therefore attached to this brief as Exhibits A and B and
Morgan's arguments are incorporated herein by reference.
Tashina does wish to address the State's assertion that the issue is moot
because other chemicals, JWH-019 and JWH-210, were also found and there is no
dispute that those chemicals are controlled substances.

(Respondent's Brief, docket

no. 40428, p.4 n1 .) Tashina acknowledges that a determination that AM-2201 was not
criminal would not necessary result in a complete dismissal of the charges as the other
chemicals were admitted to be covered by the controlled substances act. However, a
determination in her favor would have dramatically altered the trial and given her a
mistake of fact defense.
Morgan testified that the only chemical he applied was AM-2201. (Tr., p.1463,
Ls.19-25.) Thus, if the jury had been instructed that AM-2201 was legal, it could easily
have concluded that the only chemical Morgan, and by extension, Tashina, intended to
use was a legal one and that any application of JWH-019 or 210 was a mistake. If a
mistake of fact negates the existence of the required mental state it serves as a
defense.

State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 344 (1996); I.C. § 18-201(1). A conspiracy
6

consists of three things: 1) an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish
an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of that
objective, and 3) the intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive crime.
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690 (Ct. App. 2008).

The jury could easily have

determined, under the facts of this case, that the only chemical intentionally placed on
the plants was AM-2201 and that application of the other chemicals was a mistake. In
such a case, Tashina would not have the intent to accomplish an illegal objective or the
intent to commit the underlying crime.
Thus, the district court's order removed a mistake of fact defense that Tashina
could have pursued at trial.

The issue is therefore not moot and this case must be

remanded for further proceedings.

11.
The District Court Erred By Instructing The Jury That A Mistake Of Law Is Not A
Defense To The Conspiracy Charges

A

Introduction
Tashina asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury that ignorance

or mistake of law is not a defense. An element of conspiracy is an agreement between
two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective. Individuals who believe their
actions are legal do not have an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective. Thus,
the district court erred when, over an objection by counsel, it instructed the jury that a
mistake of law is no defense.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law

over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844
7

P.2d 691, 694 (1992). When reviewing jury instructions, this Court determines whether
the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable
law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct. App. 1993). Where, as here, there is
an objection at trial, once the appellant establishes error, the burden is on the State to
demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State

v. Perry,

150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

C.

Ignorance or Mistake of The Law Is A Defense To Conspiracy
Tashina was charged under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. § 18-1701,

and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, I.C. § 372732(f). (R., p.30.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal conspiracy is defined
as follows:
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or
offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more
of such persons does any act to effect the object of the combination or
conspiracy, each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner
and to the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho
for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each combined to commit.
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly provides:
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense defined in [the
Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons shall be punishable by a
fine or imprisonment, or both, which may not exceed the maximum
punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the conspiracy.
I.C. § 37-2732(f).
Idaho appellate courts have stated that a conspiracy consists of 1) an agreement
between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or
more overt acts in furtherance of that objective, and 3) the intent necessary to commit
the underlying substantive crime. State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690 (Ct. App. 2008)
8

(citing State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199 (Ct. App. 2004) and State v. Munhall, 118
Idaho 602, 606 (Ct. App. 1990). Conspiracy is thus a specific intent crime that requires
the intent to agree to the conspiracy and the intent to commit the offense which of the
object of the conspiracy. See id.
In this case, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that the court instruct
the jury that ignorance of the law was not a defense. (R., p.249.) Tashina objected.
(R., pp.277, 279.) She then objected further at the jury instruction conference at trial.
(Tr., p.2109, Ls.9-25.) The district court ultimately instructed the jury that a mistake or
ignorance of the law was not a defense. (R., p.405.)2
Tashina acknowledges that, generally, ignorance or a mistake of the law is not a
defense. However, conspiracy is different, because the first element an agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective. See Rolon, 146 Idaho at 690.

If the defendants in a

conspiracy truly believe that what they are doing is legal, they do not have the intent to
accomplish an illegal objective.

It does not appear that Idaho appellate courts have

resolved this specific issue but caselaw from other jurisdictions is persuasive.
In a case involving a conspiracy to violate state security laws, the Arizona
Supreme Court has stated,
Conspiracy is a crime that requires a mens rea, or specific intent, even if
the crime the conspirators are agreeing to commit does not in itself require
such intent.
2

After trial, Tashina withdrew a motion for judgment of acquittal in exchange for the
dismissal of the destruction of evidence charge. (8/21/12 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.24.)
Counsel for Tashina stated that he was going to copy the public defender's motion.
(8/21/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.24.) Several other codefendants filed a motion for a new trial
coupled with a motion for a judgment of acquittal and re-raised the mistake of law issue
in the motion for a new trial. The district court granted the motion for a new trial and the
State has appealed that order in those cases. However, because the agreement in this
case made no mention of a motion for a new trial being withdrawn in exchange for
dismissal of the destruction charge, and further made no mention of appellate rights, the
agreement does not bar litigation of this issue on appeal.
9

We agree with the California court that:
" . . . even though a conspiracy has as its object the commission of an
offense which can be committed without any specific intent, there is no
criminal conspiracy absent a specific intent to violate the law. That is,
to uphold a conviction for conspiracy to commit a 'public welfare offense'
there must be a showing that the accused knew of the law and intended to
violate it." People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 743, 376 P.2d 300, 307, 26
Cal.Rptr. 300, 307 (1962).
Accord, United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert.
den. 429 U.S. 1120, 97 S.Ct. 1155, 51 L.Ed.2d 570 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 194 N.E. 905 (1935);
People v. Harris, 294 N.Y. 424, 63 N.E.2d 17 (1945); People v. Powell, 63
N.Y. 88 (1875).

Because the trial court in the present case specifically ruled that no
intent to violate a known law need be shown for the State to prove a
conspiracy charge, and because evidence of good faith was rejected,
Gunnison's conspiracy conviction must fall.
State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604,608 (1980) (emphasis added). Further:

The crime of conspiracy has been widely regarded as involving a
consciously criminal agreement and is for that reason blameworthy and
punishable in itself: "conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between
not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each."
Id. at 607 (citing Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (emphasis added). The

Court of Appeals of California has recently stated, "[the] Defendant's good faith mistake
of law, while not a defense to the crime of selling marijuana, was a defense to the
conspiracy to commit that crime."
(2005).

People v. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, 775

"To commit the crime of conspiracy, defendant must have had the specific

intent to violate the marijuana laws (i.e., he must have known what he was doing was
illegal and he must have intended to violate the law) before he can properly be
convicted of conspiracy to violate those laws. Because conspiracy requires a specific
intent, a good faith mistake of law would provide defendant with a defense." Id. at 776.

10

This reasoning is especially persuasive considering that California defines a
conspiracy much the same way Idaho does: "The elements of the crime of conspiracy
are generally described as follows: 'A criminal conspiracy exists where it is established
that there was an unlawful agreement to commit a crime between two or more people,
and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement."' Id. at 776 (citations omitted.) Thus,
there must be an agreement to commit an illegal act as well as an overt act, just like
Idaho law requires.
Conspiracy is different than other crimes. It is the criminal agreement itself that
is blameworthy and punishable regardless of whether the underlying crime occurs. See
Gunnison, 618 P.2d at 607. The agreement must therefore be consciously criminal in

order to be punishable. See id. A mistake of law does, therefore, negate the specific
intent element of conspiracy because, with a mistake of law, there is no agreement
between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal objective. See Rolon, 146 Idaho
at 690. Thus, the district court erred by instructing the jury that mistake of law was not a
defense to the conspiracy charges.
Further, this error was not harmless. Evidence was introduced at trial from which
a jury could have reasonably concluded that Tashina lacked the necessary intent to
violate the law. According to the detective, Tashina stated that she was "well aware of'
what was happening at the warehouse and the Red Eye Hut and that she had been to
both locations." (Tr., p.832, Ls.1-4.)

Detective Andreoli testified that Tashina stated

that, "what we are doing is completely legal" because other people in Boise were doing
the same thing. (Tr., p.832, Ls.8-14.) Morgan testified that he believed his actions were
legal and that he had documentation which supported his position. (Tr., p.1426, Ls.1214.)

Considering these facts, the jury could have easily concluded that Tashina
11

reasonably believed that the "potpourri" was legal and could have prevailed on a
mistake of law defense.
CONCLUSION
Tashina requests that the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Further, she requests that,
due to instructional error, that her judgment of conviction be vacated and her case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2013.

JUSTI MlrnRTIS
Deputy ~te Appellate Public Defender
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mr. Alley was charged with the manufacturing and distribution of a controlled substance,
to wit: _"spice" and/or "potpourri." R 000032 to 000036 (Indictment). It was alleged that Mr.
Alley's manufacturing and distribution ran from November 2011 through September 2011. R.
000134 to 000170 (Affidavit for Search Warrant). During the time that Mr. Alley was engaged in
the practice of manufacturing and selling "spice", the law in Idaho was in flux. Rat 000097 to
000103.
On October 15, 2010 Governor Otter signed into law a rule promulgated by the Idaho
Board of Phamiacy in the previous month. Id The rule made it illegal to possess, manufacture,
or distribute some chemicals that had been used to make "spice." Id. Those chemicals were: CP
47,497, HU-210, JWH-018, JWH-073, JWH-200, JWH-081, and JWH-250. Id. The Board of
Pharmacy rule remained in effect until March 10, 2011, when House Bill 139 was signed into
law by Governor Otter and took immediate effect. Id: at 000102 to 000103. Whereas the Board
of Pharmacy Rule prohibited chemicals by name, HB 139 prohibited substances by describing
groups of chemicals, and further prohibited certain chemical alterations to the prohibited
chemicals. Compare R. at 0000098 to R at 000172 to 000176.
In between the time the Board of Pharmacy promulgated its rule and the time HB 139
was signed into Jaw, many in the "spice" industry began lookmg for chemicals that would be
compliant with the language contained in HB 139. Rat 000094. The language ofHB 139 was
available, and prior to its passage the language was passed along to Dr. Richard Parent along
with a list of potential chemical candidates for use in "spice." Id. After comparing the language
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of the bill with the chemical structures of the list provided to him, Dr. Parent was able to
determine that some chemicals were not covered by the language of.HB 139. Id. Specifically, Dr.
Parent concluded that AM-2201 was not covered by the language.Rat 000109 to 000110.
This information soon became common knowledge throughout Idaho, and many spice
products began using AM-2201 even before March 10, 2011. To ensure compliance with the
law, many manufacturers and distributors would get their base chemicals tested to ensure that
they were not "dirty" (i.e. containing chemicals covered under HB 139). See id. This had to be
done since one cannot tell by simply looking at a chemical what the chemical is, just as one
cannot look at a "spice" product and know with what, if any, chemical or chemicals the plant
matter has been treated. As with many others in the industry, Mr. Alley was actively engaged in
the practice of testing chemicals shipped to him to ensure those chemicals did not contain
prohibited substances. Rat 000134 to 000170.

Mr. Alley was not accused of possessing and/or distributing anything illegal prior to the
implementation of HB 139. R. 000032 to 000036; 000134 to 000170. The primary instances of
distribution were samples of "spice" taken and/or purchased at various times throughout
September 2011. Id. Specifically, the product involved is a brand called Twizted Potpourri. Id.
The State ultimately came into possession of three different products from the Twizted Potpourri
line: Fire, Ultra Hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. 000161. Those samples were obtained through

dumpster diving and controlled buys. Rat 000150 to 000155 and 000161.

Of the samples tested, a total of three different chemicals were identified by the State as
alleged controlled substances R. at 000154 to 000155 and 000166 to 000167. On September 13,
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2011, some product was taken from a dumpster and some of it was tested. R. at 000150 to
000156. It appears the seized product was potentially a part of the Twizted Potpourri line but it
is not clear which sub-product it was intended to be (i.e. Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, or Blueberry). See

id. That sample was sent in for testing on September 14, 2011 and found to contain AM-2201
and JWH-210. Id. Another sample obtained via dumpster diving on September 12, 2011 was
ultimately found to contain only AM-2201. R. at 000148 to 000156. That product was identified
as Fire Twizted Potpourri. Id.
Finally, on September 26, 2011 a controlled buy was made in which the State took
control of one sample each of Fire, Ultra-hypnotic, and Blueberry. R. at 000159 to 000162. Each
sample was tested. R. at 000167.

Fire was confumed to contain only AM~2201 as was

Blueberry. Id. Ultra Hypnotic was tested as containing JWH-019. Id. The end result is that it
appears from the State's evidence that only two samples have ever contained anything other than
AM-2201, with one sample containing JWH-210 and the other JWH-019.
The State believes that AM-2201 is a controlled substance and makes no distinction
between AM-2201 and other prohibited substances. The Defendant disagrees and thus filed his
motion to dismiss based on the contention that AM-2201 was legal in the State in ofidaho at the
time he possessed it. R. at 000079 to 000176. The Idaho Legislature amended the relevant statute

in 2012 and struck the language at issue in the present case and replaced it with the language "to
any extent." 2012 Idaho Sess. Laws 181 (hereinafter HB 502). Had the language used in HB 502
been in effect at the time of Mr. Alley's possession he would concede the language included
chemicals such as AM-2201. Nevertheless; the entirety of Mr. Alley's conduct was prior to the
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passage of HB 502 and in fact Mr. Alley's case may have been a driving factor in the
Legislature's decision to amend the language of the statute.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Defendant presented expert testimony from two
doctors of organic chemistry. They both testified that AM-2201 has a structure that substantially
differs from the structures prohibited by Idaho Code 37 § 2705(d)(30)(a), and thus, is not a
controlled substance under Idaho Law.
Specifically, Dr. Owen McDougal testified, "The chain itself [in AM-2201] is an alkyl
halide. So it has the fluorine as a functional group off of the hydrocarbon chain. In the statute it
specifies an alkyl group. Alkyl groups are nothing but carbon and hydrogen. When you add a
halogen or some other hetero atom, like oxygen or nitrogen [or fluorine], you create functionality
in the molecule, and it becomes a different class of compound." Tr. of Hearing on Motion to
Dismiss, pp 3940 (emphasis added).

Likewise, Dr. DeJesus testified that AM-2201 has a

"flouro-alkane chain" and is thus not an alkyl group, see Tr. pp. 118 to 125, and that, "[I]n the
case of substitution other than carbon, such as the one that we are dealing with in this case right
here [AM-2201], it then becomes another :functional group. It is no longer an alkyl group." Tr.
pp. 131.
Despite this testimony, the District Court denied the motion on the basis that in passing
HB 139, the legislature intended to ban chemicals used in "spice", that is, those that mimic the
"hallucinatory effects" of marijuana. R at 000308. The District Court turned to legislative intent
without having ever found any portion of the statute to be vague, ambiguous, or in conflict with
other law. R. at 297-318. Furthermore, the District Court interpreted the legislative intent as

7

applying to the pharmacological effects of certain substances without regard to actions of the
legislature suggesting precisely the opposite. Id.
Based on the concerns Mr. Alley had with the decision as issued by the District Court Mr.
Alley filed a Motion to Reconsider. R. at 334~63. The District Court ruled from the bench on the
motion and upheld its prior decision on the same grounds and reasoning

as set forth in the

written decision. R. at 379. As a result of the fmdings and conclusions of the District Court Mr.
Alley entered a conditional plea of guilty. R. at 447-49.

Mr. Alleys conditional plea was based on the Court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See
R. at 000297 to 000318. It is Mr. Alley's position that the District Court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss and his subsequent motion reconsider, because Idaho Code § 2705(d)(30)(a)
(2011) did not prohibit the possession, manufacturing, or distribution of the chemical AM-220 I.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
On appeal, Defendant argues that the judgment of conviction should be overturned

because the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss was in error. Defendant maintains:
(1) AM-2201 was not prohibited by the relevant statutory language in place at the time of the
alleged offense (which has since been amended to be broader and now unarguably prohibits AM2201), specifically:
a) The district court improperly turned to legislative intent in interpreting Idaho Code§
2705(d)(30)(a);
b) The dis1rict court's improperly considered the alleged effects of AM-2201 in
interpreting § 2705(d)(30)(a);
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c) § 2705(d)(30)(a) is not ambiguous and does not prohibit AM-2201; and
d) In the alternative, to the extent§ 2705(d)(30Xa) is ambiguous, the district court should
have applied the rule of lenity, and if it had done so, it should have concluded that
2705(dX30)(a) does not prohibit AM-2201.
(2) that the interpretation afforded I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a) by the district court renders it
unconstitutionally vague.

ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court incorrectlf determined that AM-2201 is prohibited by I.C. § 372705(d)(30)
The question of whether a substance is designated in the Controlled Substance Act as a
controlled substance is a question of law for the court. State v. Hobbs, 101 Idaho 262, 262
(1980); State v. Kellog, 102 Idaho 628 (1981). As such, appellate review is de novo. See State v.

Doe, 92 P. 3d 521, 523-24; 140 Idaho 271 (2004).
A. The Court improperly resorted to examining legislative history without first
determining whether the statutory language was ambiguous.
In interpreting statutory language, a court must give the words their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning.

Where statw;ory language is not ambiguous, the court should not consult

legislative history or other extrinsic evidence.

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med Ctr., 151

Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (citing City ofSun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho
665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). In its order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment, the District Court judge cited the language in Verska prohibiting it from resorting to
legislative history if it determined the statute's plain language was unambiguous.
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Despite its correct recitation of the law with regard to statutory interpretation, the District
Court then proceeded to resort to legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended LC.
§ 37-2705(d)(30) to prohibit AM~2201. The Court's reliance on legislative intent is evidenced by

the Court's framing of the issue when it asked, "what did the legislature intend to add to Schedule

I?" R. at 300 and 304. The Court then turned to the entirety of I.C. § 37-2705(d) and concluded
that "[b]y stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is fairly ease to
discern the intention of the legislature[.]" R. at 306. Other language evidencing the Court's
reliance on the legislative intent includes, "[t]he minutes of the legislative committees," "the
Idaho legislature unambiguously intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana

to

Schedule

I... •t and "[i]t was the intent of the legislature." R. at 308 (emphasis added).
Based on the legislative history, the Court concluded that the legislature "unambiguously
intended to add synthetic imitators of marijuana to Schedule I and did so in broad language that
encompasses AM-2201." R. at 307-08. That is, the District Court ultimately concluded that the

statute was unambiguous, but reached its conclusion that the language in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)
prohibiting "THC 'and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar
chemical structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the
hallucinog~nic properties of marijuana" by resorting to legislative history.
Accordingly, the District Court erred in resorting to legislative history first, and then
using that legislative history to conclude that the unambiguous language of the statute prohibited
AM-2201.
What is more is that in making its analysis the District Court omitted any discussion of,
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or consideration for, other acts of the legislature when passing HB 139. Specifically, the removal
of certain language from the relevant section of the code. The language that was removed looked
expressly at the pharmacological effects of a substance. The remaining language referred only to
the structural elements of the substance in question.
The version of Idaho Code § 37-2705(dX30) that was in place prior to the 2011
legislative passage of House Bill 139 read:
Tetrahydrocannabinols. Synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the
plant, or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances,
derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure and pharmacological
activity such as the following:
I.C. § 37-2705(dX30)(2010)(emphasis added).
The 2011 House Bill 139 that added subsection (ii)(a), which was the subject of the
arguments before

this Court, also removed from I.e. § 37-2705(d)(30) the term

"pharmacological activity" so that it now reads:
Tetrahydrocannabinols-~or synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant,
or in the resinous ex:tractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic substances, derivatives,
and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:
I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(201 l)(emphasis added).
The removal of the language "pharmacological activity" is quite telling as it creates a
plain reading of the statute that does not take into consideration 1:}le pharmacological or
hallucinogenic effects a given substance may have. A plain reading of the relevant section of
statute now requires looking solely at the structural elements of a substance in determining if it
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contained within the purview of the statute.
Indeed, the removal of the pharmacological reference in subsection (30) makes the statute
more consistent with the language being added under subsection (30) in that all of the language
contained in the subsections of (30) is entirely structural related. Those subsections, such as
subsection (30)(a)--the subsection in question in the present case--describe naphthyls, indoles,
nitrogen atoms on the indole ring, alkyls, alkenyls, cycloalkylmethyls, and cycloalkylethyls. All
of those describe structures and not pharmacological effects of a given substance. Even more
compelling is considering how fine a point is placed on the structural descriptions. Toe sole
difference between an alkyl and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between
two carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. The only difference between the cycloalkylmethyls and
cycloalkylethyls is the relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms present Tr. at 43:2-44:3.
For the legislature to break down structural descriptions to the point of discerning between a
single bond and double bond or a single carbon atom is indicative of a severe focus on structure
and not effect.
The result is that while the district court should not have considered the legislative history

in reaching its conclusion even where it did consider such history it did not accoW1t for the
legislature's actions in removing references to pharmacological effects and extreme focus on
structure. For both reasons the district court's decision was improper and should. be overturned.

B. The Court's determination that LC. § 37-2705(d) prohibits all "synthetic
substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" was error.
The proper procedure would have been to begin by examining the plain language of LC.
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§ 37~2705(d)(30), which defines tetrahydrocannabinol, "synthetic equivalents of the substances

contained in the plant or in the resinous extractives of Cannabis," and, as relevant here,
"synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure [to THC]" as
Schedule I drugs. Had the District Court followed this procedure, it would not have concluded ·
that the statute prohibits all "synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of
marijuana," because the statutory language states that it is prohibiting substances with "similar
chemical structure" to tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the primary psychoactive chemical in
marijuana) and other synthetic equivalents of the chemicals contained in marijuana.
The District Court reached its erroneous conclusion by determining that, in enacting I.C.
§ 37-2705(d)(30), the legislature was attempting to prohibit "spice" (plant matter combined with

chemicals that have similar effects to THC or marijuana), and concluding that the list of
prohibited chemical structures following the language "such as" in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) was
provided merely by way of example and thus could not narrow the language preceding the words
"such as."
The District Court was correct in concluding that the plain meaning of "such as'' is that
whatever list follows, it is non-exhaustive.

However, the fact that the statute does not

specifically list every chemical it prohibits does not render the list meaningless. In detennining
the meaning of a statute, courts must give effect to all the words of the statute so that none will

be rendered void, superfluous, or redundant. Hillside Landscape Const., Inc. v. City ofLewiston,
151 Idaho 749,264 P.3d 388 (2011) (citing State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,
309 (2006)). Presumably, the legislature did not expend time and resources drafting a list of
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prohibited chemicals idly, but rather to instruct the courts as to what it meant by "similar
chemical structure." See Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, %3 P.2d 1168, 131 Idaho 731 (1998) (nonexhaustive list added to statute by amendment "clarified the language" of the statute).
Moreover, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, non-exhaustive lists can and,
indeed, do narrow the general language they explain. See State v. Cobb, 969 P.2d 244, 132
Idaho 195 (1998) (disturbing the peace ordinance survived constitutional vagueness challenge
because it included a non-exclusive list of examples of proscribed conduct). It is a rule of
statutory construction that "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or
things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class
or character to those specifically enumerated." State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850,
854 (2001). According to this rule, to determine whether AM-2201 was included within the
general term "synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure
[to THC]," the District Court should have considered whether AM-2201 is of a like or similar
class, character, and severity to those classes of chemical structures specifically enumerated.

See, e.g., State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.Jd 1083, 1087, 139 Idaho 482 (2003) (criminal statute using a
non-exclusive list does not prohibit conduct of similar class and character but lesser severity);

Johnson v. Sunshine Min. Co., Inc., 684 P. 2d 268, I 06 Idaho 866 ( 1984) (non-exhaustive list of
recreational activities that included "pleasure driving" also encompassed motorcycling for
pleasure because it was sufficiently similar to the activities listed).
Further, the examples included in a non-exhaustive list can also narrow the definition of
another listed example. In Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd, 159 P.3d 896, 901 (Idaho
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2007), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether email correspondence
between a public employee and her supervisor was covered by the personnel records exemption
from disclosure under the state's public records act. The act did not define "personnel records"
but instead provided a non-exhaustive list of exempt personnel records. Although one of the
listed examples was "correspondence" and the Court acknowledged that the emails were a type
of correspondence, it held that "in context, it becomes clear that . . . only those types of
correspondence typically found in a personnel file [are exempt] ... [the emails] are informal
communications between an employee

and

her

supervisor,

unrelated

to personnel

administration." Id. at 902. That is, even though "correspondence" was specifically included in
a non-exclusive list, the Court held that, in context, the meaning of "correspondence" was
narrowed by the other items included in the list.
Here, the District Court refused to undertake this analysis.

Rather, it improperly

examined the legislative history to determine that the statute was intended to "deal with the socalled 'spice' problem" and thus interpreted the general language as prohibiting all substances
that could have similar hallucinatory effects to marijuana, regardless of their lack of similarity to
the chemical structures listed in the statute with regard to structure or potency. Rather than
engage in the kind of statutory interpretation required by Idaho's case law, the District Court
rendered the legislature's non-exhaustive list meaningless.
Indeed, the non-exhaustive list provided in the code includes subsections (a) through (i),
most of which contained yet another list within them. For example, subsection (a) contains a
subset list of "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." As
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with any other words in the statute these words too, must be given effect and cannot be rendered
superfluous or meaningless.
Nevertheless, the district court's opinion does not consider itself with the meaning and
application of those terms or what purpose they serve in the overall application of the statute. Yet
they do serve a purpose, That purpose is to place context and limits to the applicability of the
statute. Those words denote very specific chemical structures that are intended to fall within the
purview of the statute. In short, they define the scope of the statute.
Where a chemical falls outside of the type and nature being described by those terms it by
definition falls outside of the list of chemicals expressly covered in the statute. As noted by Dr.
McDougal, the chemical AM-2201 does not just fall outside of the scope of chemicals described

in subsection (d)(30Xii)(a) it is in a different "class" altogether. Tr. at 39:940:6. It is this
structural separation between AM-2201 and the chemicals described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) that places
AM-2201 outside of the scope of the statute and therefore legal under the law in effect at the
time. Because the district court looked solely to similarity in pharmacological effect and
disregards the limiting nature of the structural descriptions in the statute the decision of the
district court should be reversed.

C. AM-2201 is not included among the substances prohibited by I.C. § 37-2705(d)
A correct statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that AM-2201 is not a prohibited
substance. As noted by the District Court, I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30), unlike other sections of LC. §
37-2705, does not prohibit specific chemicals. Rather, it prohibits 'Tt]etrahydrocannabinols or
synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in . . . Cannabis, sp. and/or synthetic
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substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as the following:"
There are two subsections, the first of which prohibits THC and its optical isomers, and the
second of which prohibits "the following synthetic drugs" and then lists in each of its subsubsections 11any compound structurally derived from 11 one of six chemicals "by substitution at
the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyl or 2-(4morpholinyl)ethyl, whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or
not substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent."
In the present context the "non-exhaustive" list is exceptionally narrow. The differences
between the examples are the·relative number of hydrogen to carbon atoms (cycloalkylmethyl or
cycloalkylethyl), the number of bonds between carbon atoms (alkenyls), and the length of a
hydrogen and carbon chain (alkyls). I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(a). All the examples hinge around
differences in chemical chains containing only hydrogen and carbon. Consequently, at the
molecular level, all non-hydrogen and carbon chains fall outside the list Otherwise, one would
expect that the list would have covered non-hydrogen and carbon type substituents. 1 Due to the
highly technical, specific, and minute distinctions between the examples this Court should take
great caution in applying the "such as" language beyond the types of examples provided. AM2201 is not of the type listed because it contains a non-hydrogen and carbon atom substituent
It should be noted here that the district court never made any findings as whether AM-

code was amended in 2012 to accomplish precisely this, as it removed the language limiting
the examples to alkyls, alkenyls, etc., and replaced that language with ,.to any extent," thereby
including all possible constituents in the example list. Compare I.C. § 37-3705(d)(30)(a) (2011)
and 37-2705(d)(30)(a) (2012).
1The
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2201 was expressly covered by the language in (d)(30)(ii)(a). The district court rested almost
entirely on the language contained in (d)(30) and on its conclusions that AM-2201 allegedly
exhibits pharmacological effects similar to THC. As such, to the extent this Court addresses the
issue of whether AM-2201 is described in (d)(30)(ii)(a) it is doing so independent of the
conclusions of the district court.

D. To the extent the statute is ambiguous as to whether AM-2201 is prohibited, the
rule of lenity requires that the statute be interpreted in Defendants' favor.
The rule of lenity, as applied to criminal statutes, requires that any ambiguity should be
strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,386 (Ct. App.

1998); see also Capital Care Ctr. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776,
(1997). In construing statutory language in the criminal code, the court in Herrera-Brito held
that "[aJn act cannot be held criminal under a statute unless it clearly appears from the language
used that the legislature so intended." Id. at 387 (emphasis supplied). The order of the language
in that quote is essential to the proper application of the rule of lenity. The Court should not look
to, or apply, legislative intent. Rather, the language of the statute itself must make evident the
intent of the legislature to criminalize the specific conduct of the accused.
This di~nction is further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
[wJhile the appellant may be correct that it was the legislative intent to deter not only a
person who actually possesses a gun, but all principals involved in a crime in which a
dangerous weapon was employed, we cannot make such an interpretation for the
legislature when no such intention appears from the language of the statute. To hold
otherwise would be supplying what the legislature left vague and this we cannot do.

State v. Morrison, 143 Idaho 459, 461 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Thompson, 101
Idaho 430,438 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
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Indeed, in Morrison the Court of Appeals found that the legislative history supported the State' s
position but concluded it was bound by the "admonition in Thompson that the intention of the
statute must appear in its language" in order to comport with the rule of lenity. Morrison, 143
Idaho at 461.
Any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the Defendant See also

McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350 (1987). To the extent the District Court relied upon extrinsic
evidence of legislative intent to determine the legal status of AM-2201, it has essentially already
implicitly concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous in this regard. The District Court's
failure to explicitly recognize this ambiguity and to construe it in favor of the Defendant was
error.
II. As applied to Defendants, LC. § 37-2705{d) is void for vagueness

In the alternative, Defendant submits that the statute is void for vagueness. Where the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, appellate review is de novo. State v. Korsen, 138
Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.

App. 2009).
A criminal defendant asserting an argument that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
bears the burden of overcoming a rebuttable presumption of statutory validity. State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706, 711 (2003). To meet his burden and overcome the presumption, a defendant can
show either that the statute failed to provide fair notice of what conduct is illegal or that the
statute failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police lacked appropriate guidelines in
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the statute's enforcement. Id.
Vague statutes violate the due process rights of an individual under the federal
constitution as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, and also violate the due process
rights of Idahoans under the Idaho Constitution. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) and City ofLewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347 (1956). Typically, a statute that "either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning,· and differ as to its application" is unconstitutionally vague.

Capital Care Center v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 129 Idaho 773, 776, (1997)
(internal citations omitted). In the case of a criminal statute, there is less tolerance for vague
language than what might otherwise be permitted under a "civil or non-criminal statute." Id.
(citing Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.• 117 Idaho 706, 716 (1990)). Indeed, when analyzing a civil or
non-criminal statute, the language is not impermissibly vague so long as "persons of ordinary
intelligence can derive 'core meaning' from them." Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho
346, 354 (2005). Perhaps this is because it has long been recognized that "in most English words
and phrases there lurk uncertainties." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 585 (1990Xciting Rose v.

Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975)).
However, noticeably absent from the vagueness test for criminal statutes is the "core
meaning" element. Compare Capital Care Center, 129 Idaho at 776 and Kolar, 142 Idaho at
354. It is not enough in the criminal context that the party accused of a criminal act should have
understood the "core meaning" of the statute. Rather, the language must be sufficiently clear so
that the accused should have known the precise conduct being prohibited or mandated.
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Therefore, when it comes to criminal statutes, there can be little tolerance of the ''uncertainties"
that "lurk" in "word and phrases" of the English language.

In the criminal context, a statute must provide "fair warning of the conduct that it makes
a crime" such that the conduct punished as criminal (here, possession of the chemical AM-2201)

is "plainly and unmistakably" within the provisions of a statute. State v. Kavajecz, 80 P.3d 1083,
139 Idaho 482 (2003). So far as possible, to comport with due process requirements, criminal
statutes must draw a clear line and provide "fair warning ... in language that the common world
will understand" what the law intends to do if that line is crossed. Id (citing United States v.

Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1224, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997)).
Here, not only can the "common world" not understand which chemicals are prohibited
under the statute, experts in the field of organic chemistry do not understand where the line is
drawn.
Defendant presented the. testimony of two highly qualified experts in the field in Dr.
McDougal and Dr. De Jesus. Tr. pp. 29 to 174. Each has significant experience and education in
the field of organic chemistry. Id., see also R 000187 to 000198. Both experts concluded that
AM-2201 is not described under the statute. See id, see also R 000354 to 000363. Moreover,
Defendant did not contact numerous experts and then pick only the ones that agreed with his
position. The Defendant selected the experts based upon their qualifications and had each
independently analyze AM-2201 under the statute. Defendant's experts unanimously concluded
that AM-2201 was not described under the statute.
The State elicited expert testimony from a State lab technician ( employed by the State
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and under the direction of the State Police) who testifed that an "alkyl" is inclusive of
"baloalkyls." The Defendant posits that this because the State is unable to find anyone with a
doctorate level of education and unaffiliated with the State who would agree with the position of

Mr. Sincerbeaux, the State's expert, who holds only a Bachelor's degree and is a longtime
employee of the Sta~.
Regardless, it is apparent from the conflicting expert testimony presented in this case that
the statute fails to provide clear warning of what is prohibited. even to experts. Certainly,
individuals of common intelligence · could conclude that because the substitutions listed as
prohibited are all comprised entirely of carbon and hydrogen atoms, substitution by haloalkyl is
not prohibited because haloalkyls include adding entirely different types of atoms (fluorine).
A disagreement between experts does not inherently make a Jaw vague, but it is relevant

to a determination of vagueness because the vagueness test itself asks how a person of common
intelligence would view the statute. Consequently, where even experts cannot agree on the
meaning of the language in a statute, one cannot expect that lay persons would be able to
determine what is and is not intended to be prohibited with any reasonable accuracy.
Likewise, although a subsequent clarifying amendment is not conclusive in a vagueness
analysis, it is relevant to that analysis that the Idaho legislature has already taken steps to clarify
and correct for the confusion created by the initial language in the statute. In the 2012 legislative
session I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) was amended to read;
Any compound structurally derived from 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole or IH-indol-3- yl-(1naphthyl)methane by substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl,

all:ceBYl, oyolo&lkylmetbyl, eyoloalkylethyl or 2 (4 moq:,holmyl)ethyl to any extent,
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whether or not further substituted in the indole ring to any extent, whether or not
substituted in the naphthyl ring to any extent. 2
LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) 2012 (emphasis and strikethrough added).

While the language ''to any extent" is certainly more broad then the language it replaced
it nevertheless goes a long way in making the statute clear. As amended, individuals are placed
on notice that any substituent, irrespective of whether it is alkyl, haloalkyl, or one of the many
other variants, is prohibited. There is no question that this language includes the chemical AM2201.
Even if the vagueness in the statutory language does not rise to the level of
unconstitutionality, Judge Greenwood's interpretation of the statute as prohibiting any substance
with similar "hallucinatory effects" to marijuana introduces unconstitutional vagueness,
especially given that the effects of chemicals in the human body cannot be determined based
solely on the chemical structures of the compounds. State v. Doe, 92 P.3d 521, 140 Idaho 271
(2004) (statute that may not be facially overbroad or void for vagueness may nonetheless
interpreted in a manner that renders it unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); State v. Richards,
896 P.2d 357, 127 Idaho 31 (Ct Appeals 1995) (infumity for vagueness may be avoided by
interpreting the statute in a manner that comports with constitutional limitations).
Also relevant is that Defendant made a good faith effort to comply with Idaho law.

This was the language used in the federal law recently passed and was the model language
recommended for some time. For some unknown reason Idaho elected not to use the model
language and instead chose to list specific substituents. Only after the hearing in State v. Alley
did the State reevaluate the language and amended the language to match the model language
and make the law clear.
2
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Defendant retained experts in organic chemistry to interpret the law, and tested "spice" to ensure
that chemicals that were clearly prohibited, such as JWH-018, were not present. Although a
good faith subjective belief that conduct is n~t illegal is not a defense to illegal action, it is
relevant to establishing that reasonable people would necessarily disagree as to what the statute
prohibited, and, thus, that the statute's lack of clarity presents a due process concern, at least
insofar as whether substitution by haloalkyl is prohibited.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction entered in this case should be VACATED, because it was
based on Defendant's plea of guilty, which was conditional upon the District Court's denial of
Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was based on an error of law. Specifically, the District
Court erred in determining that AM-2201 was, at the relevant time, a controlled substance under

Idaho law. Specifically, the court erred by examining legislative history without first :finding a
statutory ambiguity, by resorting to the alleged effects of AM-2201 rather than limiting its
analysis to the chemical's structure, and by either failing to correctly interpret the statute's
unambiguous language or, in the alternative, failing to apply the rule of lenity to interpret
ambiguous language in Defendant's favor. In the alternative, to the extent that the statute can be
interpreted as prohibiting AM-2201, it is void for vagueness.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of March, 2013.

Ryan Holdaway
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ARGUMENT
The State takes issue with the Defendant's appeal on three grounds in its Brief of
Respondent (hereinafter "BOR"). The first is that the district court judge applied the plain
meaning of the statute and did not rely on legislative intent to interpret the statute in question.
The second is that the statute was clear and unambiguous and therefore not unconstitutionally
vague. Finally. the Defendant's appeal is moot. The Defendant will address each in turn.

A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION CLEARLY RELIED ON LEGISLATIVE
INTENT IN INTERPRETING THE STATUTE WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING THE
PLAIN AND COMMON MEANING OF THE WORDS AND fllRTHERMORE THE
COURT LOOKED TO PHARMACOLOGlCAL EFFECT WHERE THAT LANGUAGE
HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THlt STATUTK
The State suggests that the district court reached its conclusion by applying the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words and then referenced legislative intent merely to show the
consistency in the position (i.e. the legislative intent was apparent in the language of the statute.).
However. the formatting and language of the opinion demonstrate that not to be true. First and
foremost was the court's reliance on evidence and interpretations surrounding the alleged
psychotropic effects of AM-2201.
Without rehashing the argument made in Appellant's opemng brief the legislature
removed language from the statute relating to the pharmacological effects of the substances in
question and thereby rendered the statute entirely structure based. Appellant's Opening Brief, 1012 (Mar. 2013 ). Because the remaining language of the statute looked only to structure any
analysis as to the pharmacological effect goes beyond the plain language of the statute. See I.C. §
37-2705(d)(30). Nevertheless, the district court took into consideration alleged pharmacological
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cflccts of A\1<220 I in determining it wns a substance the legislature intended to ban. R. at 30608 :md 3 13-15. Indeed. the court considered the pharmacological effects to be an a component in
the anal:, sis when it stated. ''[t]he psychoactive substance in marijuana is Tetrahyrdocannibinol
or Tl JC 'and/or synthetic substances. derivatives. and their isomers with similar chemical
structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or \Vlllhetic substances that mimic the
hu/!11cinogenic properries of manjuana." R. at 307 (emphasis added). Later in its opinion the

district cour1 discussed further the nature of the pharmacological effects it had identified through
its own research with AM-2201. R. at 314-15.
The discussion surrounding the effects of the chemical were in answering the question
the court posed to itself asking "[i]n lay terms. is this substance [AM-2201 j a synthetic
rnnnibinoid')" R. at 313. The district court's analysis went beyond the plain and ordinary words
in the statute by looking to pharmacological effect where the legislature had removed language
expressly relating to pharmacological effect and replaced it with structural language. Therefore
the State incorrectly represents that the district court applied the plain language of the statute and
the court's decision was in error.
There is ample evidence in the cowi's written opinion that its interpretation was driven by
legislative intent and not the plain language. On page four of the court's opinion it recites
boilerplate language on the statutory construction but does not yield an interpretation of the plain
language

I.C.

~

37-2705(d)(30) at that time. R. at 300. The cou1i then recites its understanding

of the arguments relating to the chemistry of the substance in question and the statute. R. at 301304. Again. no interpretation of the statute is forthcoming in those pages. Then, the court states,
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"[ a ]s stated by Dr. De Jcsus. the Idaho legislature is not a body of chemists. The issue is what did
the legislature intend to add to Schedule I?" R. at 304. Just previous to that statement the court
evidences the fact it has looked to legislative history when it stated in parL "Nor is it apparent
from the legislative history that the lawmakers adopted the sponsor's reasoning along with the
proposed language in the bill. ... Consequently, this is not part of the legislative history and sheds
little light on the intent of the legislature." R. at 303-04 n.5. Again, that language precedes any
interpretation of the statute by the cow1.
The court then proceeds to set forth what it believes to he the relevant language of the
statute and notes that "[bjy stripping the statute dovvn to the component parts to be construed it is
fairly c<1sy to discern the intention of the legislature." R. at 306. From that language one can
reasonable conclude that the court means the legislative intent can be readily discerned from the
plain language of the statute. However, the court's next statement demonstrates that in fact that is
not the case as it then goes straight to its conclusion that "the psychoactive substance in
marijuana is [THC]" and the "synthetic substances" language is "referring to synthetic marijuana
or synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana." R. at 307. The
court could not have gotten to the "hallucinogenic prope1iies of marijuana" from the plain
language and therefore the legislative intent must have been discerned from sources other than
the statute.
Next the court references the minutes of the legislative committees when it stated,

"l tJhe

minutes of the legislative committees also make clear that the purpose behind the legislation is
the banning of categories of substances, not just particular compounds." R. at 308. But perhaps
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most convincing is the court's recitation of a Statement of Purpose supplied

the State which

states:
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the public concerning
[THC] fro111 synthetic drugs (Spice) that mimic the effects of Cannabis and identifying
additional substances to be classified in Schedule I.

R. at 307.
The language referenced by the Court is not statutory and is part of the legislative history.
Nevertheless, based on the language from the committee minutes and the Statement of Purpose
the court concluded that "imitators of marijuana," or "synthetic substances that mimic the
hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" vvcre covered

the statute. Such a conclusion could not

have been drawu from the plain language of the statute and came only after the court reviewed
and recited aspects of legislative history in making its conclusion.
There can be little doubt that the court did not apply the literal and plain language of the
statute but rather afforded the statute an interpretation based on the perceived legislative intent
outside

or the statutory language.

Of the most significant import was the court's reliance on its

conclusions as to the alleged pharmacological effects of AM-2201 in concluding it was of the
type intended to be criminalized by the legislature. It was error to do so and this Court should
reverse the district court's decision.

B. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE BECAUSE IT LENDS
ITSELF TO DIFFERING OPINIONS ON ITS MEANING AND LEAVES A PERSON OF
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE GUESSING AS TO WHAT CONDUCT IS ILLEGAL.
The language as set fo11h

in the 2011

version

of LC.

§ 37-2705(d)(30) 1s

unconstitutionally vague because it contains misleading language thereby creating confusion as
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to ,hhat is criminal and what is not The confusion begins with the statute's phrase. "synthetic
equivalents of the substances contained the plant [cannabis] ... and/or synthetic substances.
derivatives. and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... " I.C. § 372705(d)(30)(ernphasis added). The term "synthetic equivalent" leaves people guessing as to its
meaning. ft was this term the court relied upon when turning to pharmacological effect despite
language in the same paragraph stating "with similar chemical structure" and intentionally
omitting pharmacological activity. See R. at 306-07. Consequently, one can view "synthetic
equivalent" as meaning a substance that has a chemical structure that is similar to THC \Vhereas
the court adopted the opinion that it is something that behaves like THC. The plain language of
the statute fails to put people on notice that the pharmacological effects of the substance will
determine whether it is a synthetic equivalent.
The confusion continues with the legal fiction that the listed substances under the "such
as" language in any way resembles the structure of THC. A side-by-side comparison of the
substances such as JWH-018. JWH-019, JWH-122, and/or AM-2201 to THC show distinct and
substantial differences in the chemical structure. See Ex. 10(a). 1 While AM-2201 may have only
a single atom difference between it and JWH-018 both of those chemicals look nothing like
Tl-IC. id. Nevertheless. the statute references THC and criminalizes synthetic equivalents of
THC and "synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure" to THC. LC.§ 37-2705(d)(30).

The exhibits in the record contain a single exhibit that was not assigned an exhibit number but
was placed between exhibit 10 and exhibit 11. The reason for the exhibit number omission is
likely because the unnumbered exhibit was part of the motion to reconsider and not the original
motion to dismiss. For ease of reference the Defendant will refer to that exhibit as 10a.
1
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It is THC not JWII-018. to which Aivf-2201 is ultimately being compared. In providing
the list of examples of substances that have a "similar chemical structure" with THC the statute
describes whole groups oC compounds (vvhich v-iould admittedly include JWH-018) that in reality
bear no resemblance to the chemical structure of THC. The result is a complete legal fiction
wherein the legislature has deemed .IWH-018 to be structurally similar to THC despite the
factual reality to the contrary. The result is that anyone reviewing a chemical not expressly
described in the example list is left guessing as what is actually structurally similar to THC since
the example list itself does not resemble TlIC.
The confusion is compounded by the stunning degree of distinction in the example list
bct\vecn structures that arc different in only the most minute ways. The example list sets forth
compounds and then delineates the various forms of the compound that will still fall within the
statute. l.C.

~

37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Of the ways delineated, the legislature provided that any

"substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indolc ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl,
cycloalkylethyl..." would be included in the language of the statute. Id. The sole difference
between an alkly and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between one or more
carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. In other words, a single double bond anywhere on the
substituent chain renders an alkenyl rather than an alkyl. Id. The same minute distinction is
drawn out between cycloalkylmethyl and cycloalkylethyl which differ by an atom. Tr. at 43:244:3. A person looking at the list must wonder why the legislature used language so specific and
nuanced if it was not intended to provide some guidance as to which variances would be
considered similar to THC and which ones would not. If describing the "parent compound" was
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all that was necessary for an example list then the legislature only confused the matter by adding
the alkyl language as it is assumed that language serves some runction in describing the types

or

substances that are illegal. It was this aspect above all others that so troubled the Defendant's
experts vvho continually came back to that language as the defining features of the statute. It is
tliis aspect that was resolved in 2012 when the legislature amended the language to remove the
alkyl language and thereby remove some of the confusion.
The above referenced aspects of the statute made the language vague in the present case.
This is because in order for ;\M-2201 to be covered under the statute it would have to resemble
the exnmple list which in turn. by operation of legal fiction. resembles THC. Such a process
brings to mind a common logic formula ;\c-=B. B ""C. therefore A~°C. The problem arises where B
0

does not equal C but may look similar to C. At that point the logic problem breaks down and so
does the statute because of the legal fiction, and the fact that A does not factually equal B to
begin with.
When one looks at the AM-2201 in the present case it does not resemble THC. When one
looks at the example language in the statute, AM-2201 does is excluded because it does not
contain an "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyL cycloalkylethyl. or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." Tr. at
39-40. 118-25. and 131. Rather it contains an alkyl halide, also known as a haloalkyl. Id. While
only a single atom makes this distinction in the v,orld or chemistry a single atom can make a lot

of difference. Besides. if single atoms do make a difference, why then did the legislature take
pains to make distinctions between structures that are only an atom different? If the legislature
demonstrates a single atom ditkrence is worth covering under the statute then a person of
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ordinary intelligence is reasonable in concluding that a single atom rendering an alkyl to an alkyl
halide removes it from the language of the statute.
lndcccL both the Defendant and the State understood the issue rested in the determination
of \Vhcther an alkyl halide

W8S

included in subsection (ii)(a) as the briefing and arguments

focused on that issue. 1l was the court not the parties, that turned from that language, and
concluded that looking to that language "misses the point." See R. at 305.
According the district court in the present case, that ordinary person vvould be wrong
because looking to the language in subsection (ii)(a) "misses the point." R. at 305. Indeed, the
Court ultimately declines to even determine whether AM-2201 is described in subsection (ii)(a)
concluding instead that because AM-220 l behaves like THC it was therefore intended to be
covered by the statute. Such is the very essence of vagueness. Under the district court's
interpretation the language in subsection (ii)(a) serves more as a red herring than an example list
because the question would ultimately be one of pharmacological effect and not structure. See R.
at 306-08. 111 short the Defendant should have known that effect would be given to a noncodified Statement of Purpose and no effect vvould be given to the language in the example list.
It was this application of the legislative intent and disregard for the details of the example list
that rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.

C. THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AS THE MOTION WAS
SPECIFIC AS TO AM-2201, THE SUBSTANCE OF AM-2201 WAS THE PRIMARY
SUBSTANCE IDENTIFIED IN THE DEFENDANT'S OPERATION, AND IF IT WERE
FOUND THAT AM-2201 WAS NOT ILLEGAL THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE
MIST AKE OF FACT DEFENSES AT TRIAL.
The State correctly notes that the Defendant was found in possession of three different
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cherniculs. A:V1-220L JWH-019. and JWH-210. R. at 236-37. The samples were derived at
different times c1nd from different sources (i.e. dumpster dives und controlled buys). R. at 13470. The Criminal Complaint filed by the State lumped all of the substances into a single count
without distinguishing between the substances. R. at I 0-1 S and 32-36.
The Defendant acknov,:!cdges that JWH-019 and JWH-210 would fall under the
description

or proscribed chemicals in J.C.§ 37-270S(d)(J0)(ii)(a) but lakes issue with the State's

assertion that AM-2201 also falls under that statute. lt is as iC the State charged someone with
possession of marijuana. cocaine. and sugar in the same count without breaking apart the
substances. The resulting problem for the Defendant was attacking the charges as they related to
AM-2201 where AM-2201 had been rolled up in the same count as JWH-019 and JWH-210. The
Defendant approached it by filing a motion to dismiss as to the AM-2201 only.
Even if the Defendant were successful in his motion, Count

r

would have not been

dismissed in its entirety because of the remaining substances JWH-019 and JWH-210.
Nevertheless. a dismissal as to allegations relating to AM-220 I would have opened up mistake
of fact defenses to the Defendant. More specifically, if the court concluded AM-2201 was not a
controlled substance the Defendant could have. and would have. claimed he never intended to
possess either JWH-019 or JWH-2 l 0. nor did he know he was in possession of those chemicals
as he believed he possessed only AM-2201. Due to the court's conclusion this defense was
unavailable as the Defendant would essentially be saying he intended to have one controlled
substance. not three. but a controlled substance nonetheless.
The procedural quandry was caused by the method of charging and the Defendant had to
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the motion vvitli something. It was understood by the State and the Court what the nature
of the cha! lengc v,:as and its ultimate purpose. The Court stylized it as a motion to suppress in its
decision memorandum. R. at 300. Whatever the proper name for the motion its purpose was clear
to the parties invo]yed and the court and that purpose remains the same. A determination is
needed on the chemical AM-220 l as that determination either opens or closes doors to other
defenses for the Defendant. To that end

it is not a moot issue. The Defendant's appeal was

conditioned on that premise with the understanding that if AM-220 I is legal he can withdraw his
guilty pica and pursue the remainder of the charges at trial. For that reason the appeal is still
properly before this Court.

CONCLUSION
The district court improperly turned to legislative intent and history. The court
improperly

looked

to

pharmacological

effect and

consequently

rendered

an

incorrect

interpretation of the statute. It was error to do so and the court's decision should be ove1iurned.
The statute is unconstitutionally vague as it creates confusing legal fictions and focuses
on minute structural di tJerences that are not considered by the court. The statute eliminated
references to pharmacological activity and yet the alleged pharmacological effect was the driving
factor in concluding AM-220 l was covered by the statute. Because the basis for the conclusion
\Vas based on language not derived from the statute it must be unconstitutionally vague as
applied. For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the Defendant's Opening Brief the
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2013.
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